

NO-A126 858

KOREA AIR FORCE AND ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: IS THERE
POTENTIAL FOR IT?(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREV
CA Y T LEE ET AL. DEC 82


1/1

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 15/7

NL

END



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

AD A 126858

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



DTIC
ELECTE
APR 15 1983
S D

THESIS

KOREA AIR FORCE AND ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT:
IS THERE POTENTIAL FOR IT?

by

Young Tae Lee

and

Kiyoun Keum

December 1982

Thesis Advisor:

Reuben T. Harris

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

83 04 12 1983

DTIC FILE COPY

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
	AD-A126858	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Korea Air Force and Organization Development: Is There Potential For It?		Master's Thesis December 1982
6. AUTHOR(s)		7. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
Young Tae Lee and Kiyoun Keum		
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		
10. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		11. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		
12. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. REPORT DATE
		December 1982
		14. NUMBER OF PAGES
		82
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		UNCLASSIFIED
		16a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
18. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
19. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
20. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
Korea, Korea Air Force, Effectiveness, Organization Development (OD) Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement)		
21. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
<p>Organization Development is a managerial discipline which has been incorporated by all the military services in the United States of America. This thesis examines the need and potential to bring Organization Development into the Korea Air Force in the near future. After explaining what Organization Development is, and how it is used in the U.S. military, Korea's environment, its cultural traits, and the Air Force's particularities are brought into discussion.</p>		

The view is taken that OD is needed and viable in the Korea Air Force, but that OD should be tried on a gradual basis with a careful modification process.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A	



Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**Korea Air Force and Organization Development:
Is There Potential For It?**

by

Young Tae Lee
Lieutenant Colonel, Republic of Korea Air Force
B.S., Air Force Academy, Republic of Korea, 1969

and

Kiyoun Keum
Major, Republic of Korea Air Force
B.S., Air Force Academy, Republic of Korea, 1973



Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT





from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1982

Authors:

Approved by:

 Thesis Advisor
 Second Reader

Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

Organization Development is a managerial discipline which has been incorporated by all the military services in the United States of America. This thesis examines the need and potential to bring Organization Development into the Korea Air Force in the near future. After explaining what Organization Development is, and how it is used in the U. S. military, Korea's environment, its cultural traits, and the Air Force's particularities are brought into discussion. The view is taken that OD is needed and viable in the Korea Air Force, but that OD should be tried on a gradual basis with a careful modification process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	8
A.	FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS	8
B.	ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS	9
II.	ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT	10
A.	INTRODUCTION	10
B.	WHAT IS ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT?	11
C.	GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OD	13
D.	CONDITIONS OF OD	15
E.	ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES OF OD	17
1.	Assumptions About Individuals	17
2.	Assumptions About Organization Systems	18
3.	Assumptions About Change Efforts	18
4.	Assumptions About Change Agents	19
5.	Values and Belief Systems of Change Agent .	19
F.	PROCESS OF A TYPICAL OD ACTIVITY	20
1.	Scouting	22
2.	Entry	23
3.	Diagnosis	24
4.	Planning	25
5.	Action	25
6.	Evaluation	26
7.	Termination	26
G.	SUMMARY	27

III.	U.S. MILITARY OD PROGRAM	28
A.	ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE U.S. ARMY .	28
1.	Background	28
2.	Methodologies	29
3.	Personnel	31
4.	Characteristics	32
5.	Results	33
B.	HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. NAVY	33
1.	Background	33
2.	Methodologies	34
3.	Personnel	36
4.	Characteristics	37
5.	Results	37
C.	LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTATION IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE	38
1.	Background	38
2.	Methodologies	40
3.	Personnel	41
4.	Characteristics	42
5.	Results	44
D.	SUMMARY	44
IV.	CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF KOREA	46
A.	ENVIRONMENT	46
B.	SAEMAUL-UNDONG (NEW COMMUNITY MOVEMENT)	50
1.	Introduction	50
2.	Historical Background	51

3.	Basic Philosophy	53
4.	Progress and Achievement	56
5.	Saemaul-Undong in Urban Area	58
6.	Impact of Saemaul-Undong	59
C.	SUMMARY	60
V.	CONSIDERATIONS FOR STARTING OD IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE	62
A.	CULTURAL CONSIDERATION	62
B.	KOREA AIR FORCE	66
C.	EFFORTS FOR INCREASING ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE	68
D.	FACTORS HELPING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE	70
E.	FACTORS IMPEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE	71
VI.	CONCLUSION	74
	LIST OF REFERENCES	78
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	81

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents an approach for achieving organizational goals within the Republic of Korea Air Force. The underlying body of knowledge to support this approach will be based upon the concepts and techniques of Organization Development (OD).

The authors attempt to show that Organization Development is needed and viable in the Korea Air Force and also that the usage of certain OD approaches and techniques will help the Korea Air Force improve its effectiveness.

A. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Organization Development will be defined as a long-range effort to improve organizational effectiveness, using the theories and techniques of behavioral science, action research and other related areas. Later, a more formal discussion of the definition of OD will be presented. It is premised that before any attempt is made to apply OD approaches to the Korea Air Force, these approaches should be subject to a careful modification process to make them more compatible with the culture, environment, and the characteristics of Korea.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Before any attempt is made to find out the potential of applying OD in the Korea Air Force, it is necessary, first of all, to understand what OD is. Some knowledge about how it is used in other military services will be helpful as well. Then, the need for OD and its viability in the Korea Air Force should be examined. Finally, more specific considerations for starting OD in the Korea Air Force will be presented.

II. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

The world around us is changing at an increasing speed and the competition is getting severe. Just to survive today's society, people and organizations should try to adapt and change in a positive manner. As an approach to dealing with organizational change, Organization Development (OD) has been widely used inside as well as outside the military in the United States over the last ten years.

The U.S. Army, for example, with strong top management support, is utilizing about 400 OD consultants. Through understanding and participation in OD, the Army reports that it saved more than \$85 million in the one year period from March 79 to March 80.

The U.S. Navy has approximately 700 people involved full time in OD. Almost all Navy operational units have now received Human Resource Management (HRM) interventions. These standardized OD interventions are mandatory once every 18-24 months for the fleet.

The U.S. Air Force has several centralized consulting groups that travel world-wide to Air Force installations providing consultation services and conducting leadership and management education seminars.

Most of the civilian companies have separate OD departments and some of them, like GM, FORD, IBM, and XEROX have even vice presidents for OD.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide readers with some information about OD answering the questions:

- (1) What is OD?
- (2) What are the characteristics of OD?
- (3) What conditions call for OD?
- (4) What are the assumptions and values of OD?
- (5) What is the process of a typical OD effort?

B. WHAT IS ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT?

In attempting to answer the question: What is Organization Development, a variety of concepts have been expressed by leading experts in OD:

Richard Beckhard defines it as:

An effort (1) planned, (2) organization-wide, and (3) managed from the top, to (4) increase organization effectiveness and health through (5) planned interventions in the organization's "processes," using behavioral-science knowledge.

Warner Burke defines it as:

Organization development is a process of change in an organization's culture through the utilization of behavioral science technology, research and theory. More specifically, for an intervention in an organization to be OD, it must (1) respond to a felt need on the part of the client, (2) involve directly and collaboratively the client in the planning and implementing of the intervention, and (3) lead to change in the organization's culture.

Robert Golembiewski defines it as:

In intent, OD constitutes a value-loaded, theory-based set of interventions that seek a simultaneous, multiple pay-off: meeting individual and group needs, while contributing to the long-run efficiency and effectiveness of large systems.

Larry Greiner defines it as:

A process of intervention in an organization to influence its long term development through a: (a) focus on behavioral processes, (b) emphasis on a broad range of humanistic values, (c) concern for coping ability in solving problems and exploring opportunities for growth.

Edgar Schein defines it as:

OD is all the activities engaged in by managers, employees, and helpers which are directed toward building and maintaining the health of the organization as a total system. OD is for the total organization what group building and maintenance is for small groups. How it is done, by whom, and by what means will vary. What defines it is the GOAL of a healthy organization. OD should NOT be associated with what consultants and helpers do. A healthy organization can develop itself; its managers are the primary practitioners of OD. But just as healthy individuals or groups need help in maintaining their health, so organizations need help in maintaining their system health, and such help can come from internal or external consultants. OD experts should therefore be experts at helping. They should NOT get caught up with any particular technique such as survey feedback, team building, etc., but should stay focused on how to help [Ref. 1].

Wendell French and Cecil Bell Jr. define it as:

Organization development is a long-range effort to improve an organization's problem-solving and renewal processes, particularly through a more effective and collaborative management of organization culture—with special emphasis on the culture of formal work teams—with the assistance of a change agent, or catalyst, and the use of the theory and technology of applied behavioral science, including action research [Ref, 2: p. 14].

In general, Organization Development can be seen as a long-term attempt to bring about greater level of personal and interpersonal effectiveness (with special emphasis on the work group) in an organization. In most cases, some sort of outside consultant (or change agent) participates in the initial phase of the change process.

The long-run goal of OD is to help the organization learn to change itself, without outside help, in response to new problems and difficulties it encounters.

There is an emphasis on the "long-range" effort. OD is more than a one-shot intervention. The main target of the effort is usually interpersonal relationships and communications. There is a distinct humanistic flavor to OD. The way to increase the organizational effectiveness is through the work-team climate. The use of a change agent is part of the process. Both the content and the process of intervening are important for determining what constitutes an OD effort.

C. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OD

The general characteristics of an OD approach can be summarized as follows [Ref. 3: pp. 15-16]:

- (1) There is a planned program involving the whole system.

- (2) The top of the organization is aware of and committed to the program and to the management of it. This does not necessarily mean that they participate exactly the same way as other levels of the organization do, but that they accept the responsibility for the management.

(3) It is related to the organization's mission. The organization development effort is not a program to improve effectiveness in the abstract. Rather it is an effort to improve effectiveness aimed specifically at creating organization conditions that will improve the organization's ability to achieve its mission goals.

(4) It is a long-term effort. It may take two or three years for any large organization change to take effect and be maintained. This is one of the major problems in organization development efforts, because most reward systems are based on rewarding the achievement of short-term "profit" objectives. Most organization leaders are impatient with improvement efforts which take extended time. Yet, if real change is to occur and be maintained, there must be a commitment to an extended time, and a willingness to reward for the process of movement toward goals, as well as toward the specific achievement of short-term goals.

(5) Activities are action-oriented. The types of interventions and activities in which organization members participate are aimed at changing something after the activity. In this respect, OD activities are different from many other training efforts where the activity itself, such as a training course or a management workshop, is designed to produce increased knowledge, skill, or understanding, which the individual is then supposed to transfer to the operating situation. In OD efforts, the group builds in connections and follow-up activities that are aimed toward action programs.

(6) It focuses on changing attitudes and/or behavior. Although processes, procedures, ways of work, etc., do undergo change in organization development programs, the major target of change is the attitude, behavior, and performance of people in the organization.

(7) It usually relies on some form of experienced-based learning activities. The reason for this is that, if a goal is to change attitudes and/or behavior, a particular type of learning situation is required for such change to occur. One does not learn to play golf or drive a car by getting increased knowledge about how to play golf or drive a car. Nor can one change one's managerial style or strategy through receiving input of new knowledge alone. It is necessary to examine present behavior, experiment with alternatives, and begin to practice modified ways, if change is to occur.

(8) OD efforts work primarily with groups. An underlying assumption is that groups and teams are the basic units of organization to be changed or modified as one moves toward organization health and effectiveness. Individual learning and personal change do occur in OD programs but as a fallout these are not the primary goals or intentions.

D. CONDITIONS OF OD

An essential condition of any effective change program is that somebody in a strategic position really feels the need for change. Richard Beckhard lists the kinds of conditions or felt needs that call for OD efforts as follows [Ref.3: pp. 16-19]:

(1) The need to change a managerial strategy. It is a fact that many managers of small and large enterprises are today re-examining the basic strategies by which the organization is operating. They are attempting to modify their total managerial strategy including the communications patterns, location of decision-making, the reward system, etc.

(2) The need to make the organization climate more consistent with both individual needs and the changing needs of the environment. If a top manager, or strategically placed staff person, or enough people in the middle of the hierarchy, really feel this need, the organization is in a "ready state" for some planned-change effort to meet it.

(3) The need to change "cultural" norms. More and more managers are learning that they are really managing a "culture" with its own values, ground rules, norms, and power structure. If there is a felt need that the culture needs to be changed, in order to be more consistent with competitive demands or the environment, this is another condition where an organization development program is appropriate.

(4) The need to change structure and roles. An awareness by key management that "we're just not properly organized," that the work of (let's say) the research department and the work of the development department

should be separated or should be integrated; that the management-services function and the personnel function should report to the same vice-president; or that the field managers should take over some of the activities of the headquarters staff, etc. The felt need here and the problem anticipated in effecting a major structural or role change may lead to an organization development effort.

(5) The need to improve intergroup collaboration. One of the major expenditures of dysfunctional energy in organizations is the large amount of inappropriate competition between groups. When this becomes noticeable and top managers are "hurting," they are ready to initiate efforts to develop a program for increasing intergroup collaboration.

(6) The need to open up the communications system. When managers become aware of significant gap in communication up or down, or of a lack of adequate information for making decisions, they may feel the need for action to improve the situation.

(7) The need for better planning. One of the major corollaries of the increasing complexity of business and the changing demands of the environment is that the planning function, which used to be highly centralized in the president's or national director's office, now must be done by a number of people throughout the organization. Most people who are in roles requiring this skill have little formal training in it. Therefore, their planning practices are frequently crude, unsophisticated, and not too effective. An awareness of this condition by management may well lead to an organization-wide effort to improve planning and goal-setting.

(8) The need for coping with problems of merger. In today's world, it is more and more common for companies to merge, for divisions of organizations to merge, for church organizations to merge, for subgroups doing similar tasks to merge. In every merger situation, there is the surviving partner and the merged partner. The human problems concerned with such a process are tremendous and may be very destructive to organization health. Awareness of this, and/or a feeling of hurting as the results of a recent merger, may well cause a management to induce a planned program for coping with the problem.

(9) Need for change in motivation of the work force. This could be an "umbrella" statement, but here it specially refers to situations which are becoming more and

more frequent where there is a need for changing the "psychological ownership" condition within the work force.

E. ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES OF OD

An OD observer views things through his own perceptual filters. Most behaviors are not directly observable so he has to depend upon perceptions. Therefore, it is important to know what kind of values the observer has and what kind of assumptions he makes when OD change agents come to work. Richard Beckhard made an extensive listing of assumptions consistent with other experts as follows [Ref.4].

1. Assumptions about Individuals

- (1) Most individuals wish to grow and develop.
- (2) Most individuals want their organization to succeed.
- (3) Most individuals tend to be resistant to change particularly if goals or means toward them are unclear.
- (4) Most individuals need reference groups in an organization.
- (5) The peer group usually is a primary reference group.
- (6) Individuals tend to support change more if they have participated in planning change.
- (7) Individuals can learn to improve their diagnostic skills to better analyze a situation and plan its change.
- (8) Most individuals in hierarchical organizations have learned to resist, avoid, or suppress confrontation and management of conflict.
- (9) Individuals have membership in several groups (i.e., subordinate, head of a work family, colleague group, etc.). Therefore effective work performance requires effective leadership and membership skills.

2. Assumptions about Organization Systems

(1) The larger organization system is composed of a series of overlapping work groups connected by linking pins. The basic unit of change in an organization is usually a face-to-face group.

(2) Any change in a sub-system is likely to affect the whole system.

(3) A particular aspect of a system (i.e., morale, quality of communication, etc.) is in a quasi-stationary equilibrium held there by opposing forces.

(4) Most hierarchical organizations have norms of relatively low openness due to a low level of trust.

(5) Most organizations have norms of suppressing, avoiding, or compromising conflict within work groups and between groups.

3. Assumptions about Change Efforts

(1) Every change effort involves changed attitudes. Attitudes must be unfrozen, new ones learned, and refreezing achieved.

(2) A basic change is to create conditions where those affected by the change can systematically and meaningfully plan it and carry it out.

(3) Work families or peer groups make natural learning groups.

(4) Relationships, interpersonal communications, and values are matters on which working groups should spend some work time.

(5) A universal target of change is to help people diagnose their own acts and learn from them.

(6) Any organization change effort must have goals that are meaningful to those who will be affected by the change.

(7) To change a sub-system, relevant aspects of the environment must also be changed. Examples: (a) Supervisor's attitudes toward subordinates' learning at a training program. (b) President's attitude toward management development.

(8) The place to begin a change effort is where stress or strain or an identified problem exists—not necessarily at some arbitrary point in the hierarchy.

(9) If basic structural changes are contemplated, change should start at the policy-making level.

(10) Both the formal and informal organizations should be considered.

(11) Systematic information collection, feedback, and action planning by the system to be changed, closely related in time, helps the implementation of change efforts.

(12) Change of norms toward more openness is an early priority.

(13) Norm changes in the early stages of an "improvement program" can usually best be accomplished through an "objective mediator" or catalyst. He provides support so that individuals are more likely to take some interpersonal risks.

4. Assumptions about Change Agents

(1) A personal relationship of trust and mutual confidence must be established with each "client" as early as possible.

(2) He must deal with the dependency relationship usually existing in a helping relationship.

(3) He must concentrate on diagnosis of the problem and avoid the temptation of early solutions.

(4) He must control his own needs to control the situation or the client.

(5) He must avoid defending, advising, premature persuasion, and over-controlling.

(6) The change agent must build in plans for stabilizing and maintaining change without undue dependence on him.

5. Values and Belief Systems of Change Agent

(1) Behavioral scientist-change agents tend to place a value on optimism. It is a kind of optimism that people

can do a better job of goal setting and facing up to and solving problems, not an optimism that says the number of problems is diminishing.

(2) They believe work and life can become richer and more meaningful, and organized effort more effective and enjoyable, if feelings and sentiments are permitted to be a more legitimate part of the culture of organizations.

(3) They tend to commit broadly to both action and research, which can include inquiry and examination into the nature of change processes and the effectiveness of interventions.

(4) Presumably they place value on democratization of organizations or on "power equalization" [Ref. 2: p. 35].

F. PROCESS OF A TYPICAL OD ACTIVITY

There have been many attempts to design a multi-stage model based on an organization development approach to consultation. The Kolb-Frohman model is a model that incorporates the major points of those attempts [Ref.5: pp. 51-65].

The model focuses on two central issues which are highly interrelated. One concerns the relationship between client and consultant, and the other concerns the nature of the work. It is typically the second issue that receives the most attention from consultants even though relationship factors also strongly affect the course and outcome of consulting work. These two issues can be considered within the framework of a dynamic, seven-stage model of the planned change process: scouting, entry, diagnosis, planning, action, evaluation, and termination (Figure 1).




Figure 1 : Kolb-Frohman Model

These stages are by no means clear-cut in practice. They may occur sequentially or simultaneously. However, the articulation of each stage provides a convenient way for the consultant to conceptualize and recognize the stages in his practice.

In the figure, the arrows connecting the stages illustrate the general developmental nature of the model. The first feedback loop, from planning to entry, defines the need for renegotiation with the client in light of diagnosis and planning activities. The second loop, from evaluation to planning, defines the need for using the evaluations of previous actions to modify planning activities.

1. Scouting

Neither the client nor the consultant himself has committed to working with the other. Each is free to explore the potential relationship in order to obtain some preliminary data about the other. The client system is searching for resources and solutions to its problems. An invitation to a consultant to work with the client is based on the client's perception that the consultant can help in some way. The consultant is also scouting his own interests, values, and priorities in order to decide whether this client system is one with which he wants to work. Usually the first question to answer is "what about their perception of the problem and myself that led them to contact me?" The most

important result of this scouting phase is the choice of a formal entry point in the client system. It is important to identify the power structure of the client system, so the change might be established by those that accept it and have enough power to influence its achievements.

2. Entry

Once the entry point has been selected, the consultant and the client system, through the entry representative, begin to negotiate a contract. The use of the term "contract" by Kolb and Frohman is "to define if and how the succeeding stages of the planned change process will be carried out." They went on and listed ten areas in which agreement should be reached. Here, they pose a heavy emphasis on the importance of trust-based power, which they define as "the informal influence that flows from collaborative problem definition and solution." Hence, to create and reinforce trust-based power is necessary to establish a collaboration relationship between the client and the consultant.

As the planned change process progresses and new information is gathered, it may be necessary to renegotiate the contract. That's because the nature of the problem may change in light of the change(s) that had already taken place and the consultant's particular expertise may become more or

less relevant to the client system. After setting these details out, the process moves to the next step.

3. Diagnosis

This phase focuses on four key elements: the client's felt problem, the client's goal, the client's resources, and the consultant's resources. The start of diagnosis with the client's "felt problem" does not mean to copy his words. It involves appreciating the client system's culture and language, being in his shoes to see the problems the way he sees them. This empathy is fundamental to insure the client's involvement in the diagnostic process. Also important is to identify the subpart(s) of the system where the problem is located and the interrelationships of those subpart(s) with the rest of the system. This is necessary to be able to anticipate the effect of the change in one part of the system on the other components. The next step is to define the client's goals; To what state is the client striving? The sources aspect of client and consultant, especially the motivation and readiness for change is important in improving the client system. Is the client system really committed to the solution of the problem? Are the key individuals responsible for implementing the change committed? What are the consultant's motives—prestige, genuine desire to help, scientific experimentation?

The consultant uses several methods to obtain the diagnostic information: interviews, surveys, and observations, etc. Another aspect to watch carefully is the client system's response to the consultant; Is he seen as a threat or a helper?

4. Planning

This phase should proceed in close cooperation with the client to insure that the plans are appropriate to his needs and that he will understand them and be committed to their execution. The specific behavioral objectives to be achieved by the change should be set at this stage. This will make the evaluation easier. Then alternative solutions or change strategies can be generated with each classifying the source of power used to implement and the organizational subsystem to which the intervention is addressed. Kolb and Frohman define six subsystems to be considered as follows:

The people subsystem - manpower and education.

The authority subsystem - formal and informal.

The information subsystem - formal and informal.

The task subsystem - satisfaction and technology.

The policy/culture subsystem - norms and values.

The environment subsystem - internal and external.

5. Action

The best change strategy developed is implemented in this phase. The better the previous phases, the smoother

will be this phase. The problems found in this phase can usually be traced back to unresolved issues in the early phases. Most of the failure is due to the unanticipated consequences of the change effort.

6. Evaluation

This phase can be done either by the same consultant or by a different consultant hired for this effort. The evaluation is conducted in terms of the specific objectives defined during the planning phase as well as interim task goals designed to determine if the change is progressing as desired.

7. Termination

By definition, the consultant-client relationship is temporary. So the termination conditions should have been clearly defined and agreed upon at the initial entry contract. There are two different termination situations; success and failure. Achievement of the goals outlined in the ENTRY-DIAGNOSIS-PLANNING phase and improvement of the client system's ability to solve the similar problem in the future are the two aspects of the success.

Failure, of course, is a very embarrassing situation for both client and consultant considering the time and resources invested.

G. SUMMARY

In an attempt to provide the reader with the basic idea of OD, this chapter has covered a wide array of materials, all of which represent a strong techno-structural foundation for the thesis. As discussed above, Organization Development is a long-range effort to increase organizational effectiveness utilizing, in most cases, some sort of outside consultant. OD uses theories and techniques from several disciplines including behavioral science, action research and other related disciplines.

OD effort involves planned changes related to the organization's mission. It focuses on changing attitudes and/or behavior, and usually relies on experienced-based learning activities. The felt need and commitment of the top managers are necessary.

With this basic information about OD, the next chapter will examine how OD is used in the U.S. military.

III. U.S. MILITARY OD PROGRAM

As a useful start in exploring whether OD in the Korea Air Force might be initiated, it is helpful to study other military OD programs. By 1978 the U.S. military had over 1,000 people engaged in full-time organization development (OD) consulting. The U.S. military OD has succeeded widely and is becoming fully institutionalized [Ref.6: p. 198].

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contrasting U.S. military OD programs: Organizational Effectiveness of the Army; Human Resource Management of the Navy; and Leadership and Management Consultation of the Air Force.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE U.S. ARMY

1. Background

In the 1960's several individual commanders experimented with behavioral science and management technology as the Army experienced societal problems and changes (e.g. racial unrest, dissent, drug and alcohol abuse, general disrespect for traditional values and institutions, and on top of these the end of the draft) and became aware of serious shortfalls in leadership and management practices [Ref. 7] [Ref. 8].

Their experiments were brought to the attention of senior leaders; and in 1972, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General B. Rogers, directed that a series of experiments be

conducted. Projects included job enrichment, human relations training, assessment centers, survey feedback, and OD. Those experiments terminated in June 1975, with a decision to adopt OD and to train selected military personnel as consultants to be used within the Army.

In July 1975, the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) was established at Fort Ord, California. A 16-week course was developed and tested, and the first regular course started in January 1976. Interest in the use of OE methods and trained personnel began to spread, and top level seminars and briefings were conducted all around the major Army commands.

The Chief of Staff of the Army remarked on the subject of OE at the Army Commanders' Conference and formed an OE Study Group [Ref. 9]. The use of OE methods has spread rapidly, and are in active use in most major commands [Ref. 10].

2. Methodologies

Organizational Effectiveness operations are conducted using the four-step process of assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation/follow-up [Ref. 11]. The assessment phase includes observations, interviews (both individual and group), various instruments (most notably the

General Organizational Questionnaire), and analyses of historical documents pertaining to the organization.

Although these are typical assessment designs, no set design is required. The expectations, limitations, and techniques for the operation are mutually contracted between the commander and the consultant.

The planning phase occurs once the assessment data has been reduced and fed back to the commander. This is a joint effort between the commander and consultant, with all decisions for implementation made by the commander. This phase is extremely critical to the success of the overall intervention.

Implementation follows the planning phase. Typical implementations might include workshop and various consulting services tailored to meet the need of the organization. These services are normally provided in the work environment.

The OE operation is evaluated and, if necessary, followed up some months after the conclusion of the implementation. A separate formal evaluation step is often not reached because the consultant provides continuous feedback and evaluation data to the commander throughout the operation.

It should be emphasized that the commander has the option to terminate the operation at any time, since OE is truly voluntary.

3. Personnel

Organizational Effectiveness consultants had been almost all officers, in grades 0-3 and 0-4, with a few 0-5s until 1979, when two pilot courses for NCOs graduated 97 students. Officers selected to attend the 16-week training course at the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS) located at Fort Ord, California, from all occupational specialties, must: be 0-3 or above; be a college graduate, preferably with a major in behavioral or management science; have troop experience; be a graduate of an officer advanced course; be retainable in the Army for 24 months on completion of training [Ref. 12: p. 2-1].

They are taught process consultation, team building, survey feedback, conflict resolution, group problem solving, and other similar OD techniques. Over 500 officers had been trained by 1978. After the approval of the Department of the Army, NCOs are now trained in the same class as officers.

Upon successful completion of the training, consultants are assigned in pairs to major Army units and installations. The consultant can expect to work in that capacity for approximately 1-1/2 to 3 years, at which time the officer is usually assigned to a branch-related duty. For a significant percentage of OE consultants their branch

reentry assignment is one which often maximizes use of OE-related skills. Repetitive consulting tours of duty are possible.

4. Characteristics

Organizational Effectiveness is managed by commanders at a variety of levels throughout the Army who are authorized the capability of providing OE consulting within their organizations. However, the actual use of the consultant by subordinate elements of the organization is voluntary, with OE operations strictly between the commander and the consultant.

Since consultants are permanently assigned to a specific installation, they are an integral part of the organization. This has its benefits and drawbacks. Being part of the organization probably means the consultant has more long-term ownership in the OD effort and is more readily available if problems arise. And the commander has the opportunity to test the compatibility of personality styles and values of the consultant with those of himself and staff before committing the unit and the consultant to the use of time and personnel resources. However, the consultant is subject to the reward and control systems of the organization, which may make it difficult to maintain proper consultant behavior.

5. Results

The Army's Organizational Effectiveness program has been enjoying the support of the top management from the beginning [Ref. 9] [Ref. 13]. This strong support is based primarily on anecdotal reports from OE clients that can be found in every OE communique [Ref. 14].

One recent report concludes that the OE process in the U.S. Army is cost effective, saying that with an estimated activity level of 3,743 OE operations during the period March 1979 to March 1980, the returns to the Army from allocating resources to OE were more than \$85 million [Ref. 10].

B. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. NAVY

1. Background

The United States Navy took its first tentative steps in establishing a Human Resource Management Program in January 1971 as it felt the need for improvement. Admiral E. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, began a one-year pilot program with a cadre of twenty-four active duty Navy personnel to "develop and evaluate new ideas and techniques in the human relations area" [Ref. 15: p.4]. By the end of 1971 a full-scale planned change was outlined by the project members as the desired approach for implementing the Organization Development Program into the Naval environment.

The overall design was a synthesis of existing strategies in Organization Development and was labeled Command Development.

After a series of pilot projects, the Navy decided in early 1973 to institutionalize the OD process. They changed the name into Human Resource Management (HRM) and established five human resource management centers with detachments throughout the world. The cultural clash that occurred during the pilot test (early consultants wore civilian clothes and were perceived to be outsiders by their clients) convinced the Navy the importance of the credibility of the consultants. Therefore, the centers and detachments are staffed with experienced line officers and senior NCOs with outstanding records and recent operational experience.

2. Methodologies

The Navy's approach is based heavily on survey-guided development [Ref. 16] and follows nine steps: (1) initial visit; (2) data gathering; (3) data analysis/diagnosis; (4) feedback; (5) Human Resource Availability (HRAV) Planning; (6) HRAV; (7) unit action; (8) follow-on activities; (9) follow-up visit [Ref. 17].

Data gathering is accomplished primarily, but not exclusively, by administering the Human Resource Management Survey. The major OD-related dimensions covered by the survey are (1) command climate (communications flow, decision making, motivation, and human resource emphasis), (2)

supervisory leadership (support, team coordination, team emphasis, goal emphasis, and work facilitation), (3) work group process (coordination, readiness, discipline), and (4) outcome measures (satisfaction, integration of meeting individual and organizational goals, and lower-level influence).

Results of the survey are analyzed, summarized, and fed back to the client. Data interpretations, client's felt needs, and consultant perceptions lead to formulation of the remaining activities of the cycle.

As a result of the survey feedback, the commanding officer (CO) often decides to have intact groups or a vertical slice (people from all organizational levels) of the ship or unit attend a one- to three-day human-resource workshop that uses a standardized series of lectures, films, and exercises on such topics as motivation, communications, MBO, leadership, and race relations. A workshop to develop a command-level human-resources action plan often follows the human-resources workshop. The plan is then implemented.

The operation is normally conducted during a unit's scheduled five-day human resource availability period at a regional consulting center or detachment for selected members, typically 10-40 percent of its assigned members [Ref. 18].

Unless the OD effort is terminated because of operational commitments, an evaluation will usually be conducted with the client organization approximately eight to ten months after the five-day availability period. A second survey may be administered at this time to identify changes. Additionally, the client may request and contract for further consulting services, or terminate the operation at his discretion.

The Navy's HRM program is mandatory and quite standardized. Although participation in the HRM program, taking the survey, and preparation of a Command Human Resource Management Action Plan are required, all the other steps in the process are optional. That is, the CO could decline to participate by not taking all the optional workshops and planning sessions.

3. Personnel

There are approximately 700 people involved full time in active consultant, administrative, and support position including a small percentage of civilians [Ref. 6: p. 193]. Of these about 500 are consultants, with 300 enlisted E-5 to E-9, 164 officers from Ensign to Captain, and 50 civilians [Ref. 19: p. 17]. They are products of a formal 12-week Human Resource Management School located at Memphis, Tennessee. The school provides basic instruction in both

organization development and content and process areas as well as Navy program specifics.

The tour of duty as a consultant is for 2-3 year period followed by a reassignment to regular fleet duty in their warfare or occupational specialty. The source of consultants is via the routine personnel assignment process although individuals may voluntarily request this type of duty. Successful consultants are given an organizational coding to indicate their expertise. This coding increases the possibility of a reassignment to human resource management work at a subsequent point in their Navy careers.

4. Chracteristics

Although Human Resource Management is mandatory and quite standardized, there is more flexibility than first appears: as each Human Resource Mangement center and detachment works as a relatively autonomous consulting center, it can tailor its interventions to the needs and readiness of its clients or to its own preferences; as the CO is only required to take some phases of the process, he can effectively decline to participate any further.

5. Results

The Navy Human Resource Mangement Efforts has now reached system-wide proportions. Enjoying the support of top management, it has currently involved 100 percent of the Navy's first line operational units [Ref. 18: P. 76].

Most COs who have participated in HRM are positive toward it. One recent estimate made by the consultants is 75 percent. Others do not like the survey, think the survey is irrelevant, or the process too time consuming. The COs who encounter HRM for the second time appear to be much more favorable toward it; they now understand the process and can zero in on problems they are interested in [Ref. 6: P. 193].

One experimental comparison of a sample of 60 units (30 experimental and 30 controls) from the Pacific Fleet found that participation in the HRM process may have short-term effects on retention of younger personnel (it improved 5.8 percent during the six-month period in which HRM occurred), but that the effects may not last (after the six-months or more the improved re-enlistment rates were not sustained) [Ref. 20].

Another study compared 103 (experimental) ships that had participated in HRM with 103 matched (control) ships that had not. It appears that the experimental ships had significantly higher scores for overall readiness and equipment readiness than did the control ships [Ref. 21].

C. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTATION IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE

1. Background

In mid-1975, the United States Air Force Management Improvement Group examined many nontechnical aspects of Air

Force life and work. They administered a 150-item questionnaire to more than 58,000 (approximately 11 percent) randomly selected Air Force members to determine attitudes associated with a variety of quality of life issues.

The analysis of the data revealed one area that caused particularly high concern: 81 percent responded good leadership and supervision was highly important; but 72 percent rated the quality of Air Force leadership average to poor (41 percent rated it average, 31 percent below average or poor, and 26 percent excellent or above average). This finding coupled with other more extensive data relating to this perception, suggested to the group to recommend that an organization be created to revitalize leadership and management training for Air Force supervisors.

General D. Jones, the Air Force Chief of Staff, directed, based upon this recommendation, to establish the Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC) in the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He further specified that management consultation field teams be formed to travel to Air Force organizations world-wide to (1) conduct leadership and management education seminars for supervisory personnel at all levels within the host organizations, and (2) provide management consultation service to the host commanders and their subordinate commanders, managers and supervisors.

In December 1975 the first LMDC consultation team was formed and began its education-consultation efforts from the next year. The leadership seminars with consulting activities to broad but simple leadership problems were the focus of the early team efforts. In response to the growing demand for LMDC services, three ten-member teams were formed in October 1976 and began visiting world-wide [Ref. 22].

2. Methodologies

Participation in the Air Force's Management Consulting program is voluntary. Requests for assistance are usually initiated by wing commanders and most consulting activities are conducted at the wing level. Upon receipt of a consulting request, the LMDC dispatches a 4 or 5 person consulting team to the requesting organization as quickly as possible. This team is responsible for data collection, the first step of the management consultation process which includes (1) data collection, (2) analysis, (3) feedback, (4) management action plan, and (5) follow-up.

Data collection is done by (1) administering the 109-question Organizational Assessment Package (OAP) to all identified work groups within the client organization, (2) administering a Supervisory Assessment Package to supervisors in the client unit whenever appropriate, (3) interviewing supervisors and key people at all organizational levels, and (4) collecting other relevant data.

Once the data are collected, they are taken to the LMDC for computer processing. The data are incorporated into a management consultation data base which has accumulated more than 100,000 cases, with the client organization receiving computer printouts that include normative data, demographic data, and tests for statistical significance.

In about four to six weeks, when the diagnostic results are available, a larger team (8 to 10 people) returns to client organization to feed back assessment results and implement interventions tailored to the organization.

A management action planning is then conducted, and specific intervention strategies are identified for future implementation. The visiting consulting team usually works in the client system for two to three weeks. Commonly employed at this time are interventions for all work groups and a full range of workshop and seminars.

A post-organizational assessment is conducted 4-6 months after the completion of previously planned interventions. The resulting data are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention and may be used in planning subsequent follow-up activities[Ref. 23].

3. Personnel

LMDC consultants (mostly Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels and senior NCOs) are selected based on outstanding

performance in their functional area. Most have had extensive formal training and education, and each has brought with him or her many years of experience in one or more of the many Air Force functional career fields. Selection is accomplished by means of special application, personal interview, and recommendations.

Consultant training begins with a formal five-week training course at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. They begin with some background theories necessary for consulting work. Then they learn Organization Development for theoretical and experimental introductions to entry, contracting, data gathering, diagnosis, feedback, intervention and evaluation. Case study follows to serve students as a consulting practicum. Following the five-week course, students must complete the Academic Instructor Course or equivalent. Finally, the student consultant must prepare for and make two complete consulting visits as part of a supervised consulting internship before being certified as a consultant. The entire process is a very demanding six to nine months of training. Currently there are around 40 consultants in LMDC[Ref. 22].

4. Characteristics

Air Force consultants are geographically centralized at the LMDC and are thus physically far removed from the client's chain-of-command. So every client has to make a

request through formal channels for consultants' assistance, which might be viewed as suggesting that the implied need has in fact been verified and that some commitment has been made to use the team when they arrive. The client may not have the opportunity to test the compatibility of personality styles and the values of the consultants with theirs.

The needs and norms of the user command will not necessarily be viewed from the most appropriate point of view as the consultants are not organic members of that command. After the consulting team leaves the user unit, the loosening of user-consultant ties reduces likelihood of meaningful sustainment of positive changes initiated during the operation. Also, time constraints imposed by a prearranged schedule might dictate use of less than optimal implementation strategies and reduce tactical flexibility.

As the LMDC programs utilize a small number of central experts (1) the program is relatively cheap, (2) installation manpower expenses may be minimized, (3) good quality experts become available to every part of the service, (4) high level of quality control over the experts is possible, (5) experts become very experienced in the process, and (6) base line information becomes available to permit comparisons [Ref. 23].

5. Results

During the one year period from January 1976 to March 1977, LMDC Consultation Teams visited 76 installations in the Continental United States, Alaska, Europe and the Pacific. More than 56,600 Air Force supervisors have attended the 1,123 on-site seminars conducted during this period. The increasing number of invitations indicate that the LMDC approach is working. Almost every Air Force installation has requested LMDC managerial consultation services and several bases have already made their requests for second visits. Testimonials are constantly being received which cite improved morale, increased satisfaction, greater commitment, and improved interpersonal and intergroup relations—all essential ingredients contributing to the bottom line—increased combat readiness and production effectiveness [Ref. 22].

D. SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed and analyzed the organization development (OD) efforts in the United States military. The Army uses a voluntary, decentralized approach with strong top management support, participation, and understanding. The Navy relies heavily on a standardized and centralized survey-feedback model using mandatory participation. The Air Force has a few consultants consisting of several central groups

that travel to widespread and considerably smaller installations.

With over 1,000 people involved full time in OD, the U.S. military probably has the largest OD program in existence. This fact alone can be an indirect measure of the success of the military OD program even though the perception of success is based largely on anecdotal reports, testimonials, and personal involvement of the decision makers.

The wide-spread usage and its claimed success in the U.S. military are enough to encourage further work. The next two chapters will examine the contextual environment of Korea and more specific considerations for the Korea Air Force as necessary to explore the possibility of applying OD in that organization.

IV. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF KOREA

A. ENVIRONMENT

Korea is a peninsula thrusting from the northeast Asian mainland in a southerly direction. In the adjacent geographic area are three of the world's four most powerful nations, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Japan. A fourth power, the United States of America is deeply involved in defense and other activities of the Republic of Korea.

Due to the vagaries of international politics Korea was divided into two rival regimes in 1948 and within two years of its founding had to experience the Korean War in which seventeen nations from around the globe participated as belligerents.

Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, the north Koreans violated the terms of the agreement on more than 40,000 occasions on land and sea and in the air: the Pueblo incident (1968); the Chung Wa Dae Commando incident (1968); the shooting down of U.S. reconnaissance plane EC-121 (1969); the infiltration tunnels in the DMZ discovered in 1974, 1975 and 1978; the brutal ax-murders at Panmunjom (1976); the shooting down of an unarmed U.S. helicopter (1976); promulgation of the so-called Coastal

Defense Zone along with a 200-mile fisheries protection zone (1977); frequent infiltration of spy boats, and the violation of the territorial air space over the five islands off the west coast.

Even now, despite the South's superior economy and large population, the North enjoys a formidable advantage in military power and persists in its aggressive policy toward the South.

This continuing challenge to national survival has inevitably conditioned the Republic of Korea's policy response: great emphasis on national security. Internally, this has meant a political system best suited to a maximum mobilization of national efforts for deterrence. Externally, the persisting security threat has called for a maximum foreign policy effort to mobilize international support for the Republic of Korea's defense effort, in particular, diplomatic effort to persuade the U.S. to maintain a sufficiently credible military presence in Korea.

To reduce and ultimately terminate such dependence, the Korean people have been making a determined effort to achieve the goal of a self-reliant defense. Since the launching of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, the Korean economy has maintained an 8.8 percent annual growth rate to 1980, raising the per capita GNP from U.S. \$87 to U.S. \$1,503 [Ref. 24]. The Five-Year ROK Forces

Modernization Program developed in 1975 based on ROK Forces Improvement Plan financed primarily by the fiscal source of the national defense tax was aimed at securing a defense capability to repel north Korean aggression provided it is unaided by China or Russia.

The Homeland Reserve Forces, created in 1968, have positively engaged in the defense of the homeland as well as propelling the Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement). The Combat Reserve Corps, created in 1975 and equipped with modern heavy firearms and communication equipment such as those provided for the regular army, is designed to counter the infiltration in the rear area by north Korea's specially trained task forces. The Student's National Defense Corps, organized in 1975, receives some military training and does other cooperative activities including participation in the Saemaul-Undong during peace time, while effectively shouldering the responsibility of maintaining order in the rear areas, and defending their respective areas of responsibility in time of war.

The Civil Defense Corps units, organized in every community in the land beginning in 1975, are charged with the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of people in times of enemy attack or other situations affecting the public peace and order. The Civil Air Raid Defense Training, begun in 1972, is devoted to countering atomic, biological,

and chemical warfare engaging the Civil Defense Corps in relaying messages, sheltering people at important installations, rescue operations, and fire-fighting.

The defense industry which began to develop in the early 60s, has improved in capacity and capability to a considerable level as to be able to manufacture 500MD light-armed helicopters, Cobra heavy-armed helicopters, 106mm recoilless guns, amphibious armored vehicles of Korean design, Vulcan anti-aircraft guns, 4.2-inch mortars, 105mm and 155mm howitzers [Ref. 25].

Further, South Korea has developed long and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles of its own. The developed missiles were successfully test-fired on September 26, 1978 at a west coast missile range, marking a milestone in the nation's efforts to achieve self-reliant defense capabilities. Shown in the test-firing were anti-tank missiles and multi-loaded rockets which were also produced with local technology.

President Park, Chung-hee said in his new year news conference on January 18, 1978, that "the nation has begun full-fledged mass production of air-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles and radar." By 1981, the supply of such highly sophisticated weapons will totally meet the needs of Korean armed forces. He also said that thanks to defense donations and funds from the National Defense Tax, most basic

weapons, now owned by Korean armed forces, are locally produced.

He disclosed, by inspecting the manufacturing of remodeled tanks in a certain industrial complex and watching the testing of those home-made tanks, that South Korea has begun the mass-production of M48 tanks of remodeled A3 and A5 types which are equivalent to the up-to-date U.S. M60A1 [Ref. 26].

South Korea has also successfully completed the demonstration flight of the home-made F-5F, a supersonic jet fighter, on September 9, 1982 [Ref. 27].

B. SAEMAUL-UNDONG (NEW COMMUNITY MOVEMENT)

1. Introduction

As the decade of the 70s unfolded, the cities in Korea were moving ahead at a dizzying pace, as a result of the successful implementation of two five-year economic development plans (1962-1971), while the countryside was still sunk in lethargy, passivity and even cynicism. Rural people were straggling behind their urban brethren. Something had to be done to correct this situation. The farmers had to be awakened.

The Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement) was proposed in 1970 and set in motion in 1971 with the urge that the farmers must be awakened, and that the benefits of diligence, self-help and cooperation must be brought home to

them. Ever since, the movement has become a major factor in rural development. In fact, within the short span of four years, the rural communities had developed so rapidly that in 1974, the per capita income of the farmers began to exceed that of the city workers.

The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with an insight to the Saemaul-Undong and to facilitate the examination of the implication of Korea's experience in Saemaul-Undong.

2. Historical Background

A formal and wide spread movement for rural development started in 1961 in the name of National Reconstruction Movement. Under the Central Headquarters, provincial, county, township, and village committees were organized nation-wide in a short period. Active support from the government administrative machinery was required and therefore it became a sort of top-down process. In the meantime, two five-year economic developments (1962-1971) which emphasized industrial development and expansion of exports were successfully implemented resulting in an 104.2 percent increase in gross national product with average growth rate of 9.7 percent per annum. But, the National Reconstruction Movement, which was primarily a rural-based movement, did not receive the needed financial,

administrative and political support from the government, although it was retained until 1973.

Growth in the agricultural sector lagged far behind that in the industrial sector. Accordingly, the gap between annual incomes of farm household and city workers widened. The deteriorating rural situation became a major cause for the rapid shift of the rural population into the large cities. In the 1950s the farming population constituted about 70 percent of the total population but it decreased to 46 percent in 1971.

The rapid shift in the population created many problems in the rural areas, such as serious labor shortages where mechanization was not yet known. The quality of the remaining labor force deteriorated, since mostly the elderly and women remained on the farms. Most of the villages were left without potential leaders since those who departed were relatively well-educated young men.

In light of this situation, the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1972-1976) emphasized a balanced growth between industry and agriculture. During the period, the government planned to invest \$2 billion in agricultural development. In order to maximize efficiency of the investment, the agricultural sector, especially the farmers, had to be ready to make effective use of such investment.

Traditionally, Korean rural society has been family or clan-oriented, stagnant, pre-modern, and isolated. There was much cooperative spirit shown in family affairs, such as funerals, marriages, and other social matters, but the rural people lacked training in cooperation on a rational basis in their main activity, farming. Another factor related to the necessity for training in cooperation is amalgamation of agricultural cooperative societies. The primary agricultural cooperative societies that were organized at the village level were not suitable for the introduction of modern agricultural techniques, making effective use of credit, water, and other agricultural production inputs, or for improving marketing efficiency.

In this situation, some sort of nation-wide impetus became necessary to cultivate positive attitudes in the rural masses, to assist them in gaining confidence in the future, and to nurture a spirit of self-reliance and cooperation. There was a need for a nation-wide mass movement strongly supported and spearheaded by enlightened, dedicated, efficient administrative machinery[Ref. 25].

3. Basic Philosophy

The basic conceptual foundation of the Saemaul-Undong is to help rural (and urban) people develop the virtues of diligence, self-help and cooperation. It is a national modernization movement based on cultivating in the people's

mind a spontaneous urge for national development by identifying it with self-betterment.

Everybody must work hard and acquire the habit of dilligence and of a thrifty daily life. Trying to be rich without working hard is anathema to national development. The spirit of dilligence must result both from and in an assured bright future. Thus voluntarily-inspired hard work is an important ingredient of the Saemaul spirit. Voluntary effort is bound to be accompanied by creative initiative, which means the desire and ability to make something new.

The Saemaul-Undong is also designed to inculcate a spirit of self-help among the people. This spirit originates in one's sense of independence. Those who possess this spirit do not lean on others, nor do they shift their responsibilities to others, but they perform by themselves what should be done. Since the Saemaul-Undong also aims at bringing prosperity to those villagers who work for themselves, it naturally helps cultivate their awareness of communal, and eventually, national identity. In a more general sense, it encourages national self reliance, obviating dependence on financial assistance from foreign countries.

The Saemaul-Undong represents the Korean people's desire and effort to create a society in which each and every member is entitled to help community in the satisfaction of

his human needs. In order that such a society may be created, all villagers are urged to participate in various community projects such as improvement of village roads, construction of bridges, and strengthening of embankments. Cooperation leads to solidarity. When villagers see what they have achieved by mutual cooperation, they feel firmly united.

The three basic components of the Saemaul spirit, i.e., dilligence, self-help, and cooperation, are inseperably related to each other. It is necessary, therefore, that the movement harmonize the three ingredients in the course of implementation.

The element of the practical approach to the Saemaul-Undong may be divided into three categories, i.e., spiritual enlightenment, social development and economic development. First, the Saemaul-Undong is a movement to cultivate dilligence, self-reliance, and cooperation and then to put these concepts into practice. The movement is intended to teach the people the fact that individual as well as national well-being depend on the morale and voluntary initiative of the people, and therefore a progressive, productive and pioneering spirit is the basis for national and individual development. Second, the Saemaul-Undong is social development designed to create welfare in which both the rural and urban people can enjoy a cultured and harmonious

social life. Third, it is an economic development movement aimed at increasing productivity and income of the people, particularly the farmers, and thus assuring a universal and sustained high standard of living[Ref. 25].

4. Progress and Achievement

In the initial stage of the movement, main emphasis had been placed on environmental improvement. Increasing rural income has become one of the most important policy objectives of the movement since 1973. More recently, the movement has developed into a broad social movement by spreading to the urban sector.

To be charged with the overall planning and coordination of all related activities, The Saemaul-Undong Central Consultative Council was organized in 1972 under the chairmanship of the Minister of Home Affairs with the vice-ministers of all the concerned ministries and agencies as members. Similar organizations were established at each successive level, i.e., province, county, township and village.

A Saemaul Leaders' Training Institute was opened in 1972 for training village Saemaul leaders developed among the villagers.

As it became a nation-wide movement, special Saemaul Divisions were created in several ministers, all provincial

governments and in county offices. And the "Saemaul Order of Merit" was added for distinguished leaders of the movement.

Efforts were made gradually to transform the movement from a government-led drive to a popular one. For this purpose, Saemaul consultative councils were organized in private institutions in all provinces and cities, particularly to promote the urban Saemaul-Undong.

Urban Saemaul leaders, social leaders (from business, universities, religious circles, the labor movements, news media, etc.), and high-ranking government officials were included in the training of the Saemaul Leaders[Ref. 25].

A great deal of government and private investments and efforts have so far been poured into various projects dedicated to the improvement of village environment and construction of an agricultural infrastructure. As a result, 3,164 kilometers of village roads have been repaired and widened and 43,631 kilometers of farm feeder roads newly opened. A total of 9,915 reservoirs or 99 percent of the project target of reservoir construction were built and 4,402 kilometers of irrigation canals or 109 percent of the projected target newly dug, transforming nearly 90 percent of the nation's paddy fields into all-weather rice paddies.

In the fields of culture and environment, 2,740,000 rural housing units or 99 percent of the total have been provided with electricity, making it possible for farmers and

fishermen to enjoy modern amenities such as television. A total of 2,450,000 thatched-roof housing units have been replaced with tile and slate roofs. 34,123 units of multi-purpose warehouses constructed. Another outstanding achievement of the Saemaul-Undong has been remarkable increases in rural income. Per capita farm household income went up by 5.6 times in 1977 to 1,433,000 won from 256,000 won in 1970[Ref. 26].

5. Saemaul-Undong in Urban Area

The Saemaul-Undong which originally started in rural areas as a campaign to develop stagnant and poverty stricken farming areas, has spread to every corner of the country. The movement is now in full swing in urban areas as well. City dwellers have actively joined in campaigns for street cleaning and beautification as part of the urban Saemaul-Undong.

Since 1974 the Movement has spread to private enterprises and plants with emphasis given to quality management, cost reduction, labor and management cooperation and improvement of the welfare of employees. Employees are to adopt a sincere and serious attitude toward their duties, which will enable them to increase productivity, and as a consequence to increase profits to the employer, who will return the benefits by improving working conditions and workers' welfare.

The Movement in the urban sector also emphasizes improvement of the environment, promotion of sound morals and the establishment of a social order. Campaigns against traffic law violation, the utterance of vulgar words, spitting on the streets and improper manners have been waged as part of the broad urban Saemaul-Undong.

The government is guiding the Movement to become a force generating a momentum for the reinforcement of discipline in all the aspect of national life [Ref. 26].

6. Impact of Saemaul-Undong

The most important influence of the Saemaul-Undong is its impact on the morale of the people. It has helped create a cooperative spirit among the people, which is the basis for any rural development activity, and enabled the people to form a bright and positive outlook on the future. At the same time, confidence among the people ("We too can make it") has been nurtured.

The people practiced how to participate and cooperate. For any Saemaul project, voluntary and active participation of the villager is the basic requirement. All the villagers are requested to participate in the discussion for project selection, in sharing the costs of the investment, and in contributing labor for the project. Without all villagers' consent and participation, it is

impossible, for example, to make a road through a village or passing through many paddy fields.

The other important aspect of the Saemaul-Undong is development of rural leadership. To make the implementation effective, they needed leaders developed from among the villagers. Two leaders (one of each sex) are elected by the villagers, sent to the Saemaul Leaders' Training Institute for one or two weeks training, and assigned responsibilities for planning and implementing Saemaul projects for the villages. In 1978, more than 24,000 leaders were trained.

In Korea, the Saemaul-Undong is now becoming the training vehicle for the entire people to solve their own problems. Everything is done on the basis of Saemaul spirit. After five years of the movement, the initiative was gradually turned over to the people. More and more villages are initiating the bottom up process, which is possible only when a vigorous cooperative spirit is at work among the people.

C. SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed Korea's geopolitical situation, threat from the north, and its defense efforts including its economic development, and the defense industry. It also covered the Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement).

Korea needs OD. This becomes clear when we see the situation of Korea in light of the conditions that call for

OD activities: the threat from the North, the defense efforts with limited resources, and the need to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

Saemaul-Undong was originally begun to fulfill the gap between the industrial and agricultural sector, thus to promote national integrity. In its progress, it enlightened the people, changed their attitudes, and provided them with opportunities of participating, discussing and cooperating to achieve goals. It also trained a lot of leaders. All these facts provide a fertile ground for OD to live.

The next chapter will examine specifics of the Korea Air Force in the context of the possibilities for starting OD therein.

V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR STARTING OD IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE

Assumptions about the way things are and what is worthwhile or correct vary widely from culture to culture. Thus, it is necessary to discuss cultural differences that do not allow the effort to apply OD into Korean environment directly as it is presented in the Western literature. This chapter will focus on the cultural considerations in applying OD in Korea and the specific environment of the Korea Air Force. Then, discussions of factors both helping and impeding the application of OD in the Korea Air Force will be followed.

A. CULTURAL CONSIDERATION

Religion and values are inextricably entwined in Korean social structure. Of these, Confucianism has had by far the longest and most intense influence on the ideas and values of Korean people since the 14th century [Ref. 28: p. 102]. Buddhism had grown to be a tremendous economic and political power in the long centuries of its predominance; in order to crush that power once and for all, the rules of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) adopted Confucianism as the central and orthodox tradition. Confucianism was thus deliberately introduced as an instrument to suppress Buddhism influence in Korean society. This policy succeeded and Confucianism came

to predominate in the intellectual and spiritual life of Korea.

Now Confucius and his disciples are no longer revered as sages in Korea except among a small number of people. Most Koreans may not even be aware that many of their fundamental ideas and values are derived from Confucian teachings. Nonetheless, these ideas and values, now taken simply as "the way things are," can be understood only with reference to their roots in this tradition [Ref. 29].

It is expressed clearly in the very first line of a primer used during the Yi dynasty: "Of all creatures between Heaven and Earth, man alone is that he possesses the Five Relationships." The Five Relationships are that (1) between father and son there should be affection, (2) between ruler and minister there should be obligation, (3) between husband and wife there should be proper distinction, (4) between elder and younger there should be proper order, (5) between friends there should be faithfulness. This doctrine of the Five Relationships is the cornerstone of all Confucian moral and social teaching. What it teaches is that there is a distinctively human level or manner of relating to others, and only by learning to relate on that level does one act in a way worthy of a human being. When this uniquely human quality is lacking in relationships, human beings sink into a subhuman level of behavior. This human quality is that one

does not seek one's own ease, convenience, or profit; that is, one does not act in a self-centered, self-interested way which is viewed in Confucian tradition as the primary root of evil and disorder.

The Confucian approach, which emphasizes human interrelatedness and reflects upon what is required to relate to others, leads to a different set of values, such as reverence for others, harmony, proper order in society, and a keen awareness of what others do for one and what one should do in return. From this perspective, the limitations of the individualistic values are more apparent than their excellence: they seem to be qualities which center the individual in himself and cut him off from others, leading to pride, irreverence, and insensitivity to others.

Closely connected with this emphasis on reverence is the traditional Korean fondness for YEUI, the rule of proper and polite behavior. Confucians held YEUI in high regard, both because its practice inculcated that sense of self-discipline and restraint which was regarded as the foundation of all sound character formation, and because it provided the forms of proper, dignified, and harmonious social interaction.

In Confucian society, age was one of the primary yardsticks of hierarchy as is reflected in the third of Five Relationships. That is, the elder should always have precedence over the younger. So ambitious young man must

bide his time and wait his turn rather than openly and aggressively challenge the view of his elders.

Three of the Five Relationships—father-son, husband-wife, and elder-younger(brothers)—directly refer to the family. Further, the relationship of ruler and minister was often paralleled with the father-son relationship. Thus the family stood at the center of everything.

Everyone outside the family is potentially someone to be treated with caution and a bit of suspicion. The family unit is the area of true security. In the inner confines of the family one can relax and find trust, love, comfort, obedience, and gaiety. The father is traditionally the respected and unquestioned head of the family, and he rules with almost absolute power if he so desires. He has full responsibility to feed the family, to find work for the members, to approve all moves, marriages, and future life of the younger members of the family [Ref.30: p. 32].

In Confucian thought, filial piety provided the groundwork for all the other virtues, and its practice touched on every aspect of life. In its most limited sense filial piety involved reverence for one's parents and a selfless devotion to their well-being. But in fact it went far beyond this as "One's body is the body of one's parents passed onto oneself. While one's parents are alive, one may not venture to consider his person his own, not consider his

possessions his own." The practice of filial piety was not restricted to family members. It also applied to the duties and responsibilities of society whenever they found themselves in a superior-inferior relationship.

Proper relationships are all-important in Korea. And most relationships are not between equals or peers but are between unequals. In this vertical society, strict protocol requires that all social superiors be treated with great respect, regardless of personal feelings toward them.

So it is important that one's "face" or reputation be preserved in many cases. This inevitably places much emphasis on preserving the good feelings of others. Because of this emphasis on feelings and appearance, it is often more important that things appear well than that they actually be well. When something displeases them, they try to make their feelings known indirectly in a way that will not injure the relationship they cherish. Circumlocution is usually an effective means.

B. KOREA AIR FORCE

The Korea Air Force personnel represents about 5 percent of the country's total Armed Forces. The other branches of the Armed Forces of the country are the Army, and the Navy in which the Marine Corps is included.

Principal components of the Air Force are the Combat Air Command, the Air Logistic Command, and the Aviation training Command.

The Air Force is composed of 15 fighter-bomber squadrons, 1 fighter reconnaissance squadron, 3 tactical transportation squadrons, 1 search and rescue squadron and some others. It has 378 combat aircraft with Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles and Maverick air-to-ground missiles. But North Korea has 51,000 personnel (6.4 percent of its total Armed Forces), and 700 combat aircraft in its Air Force [Ref. 31: pp. 82-84].

To bridge this gap, more than 100 state-of-the-art U.S. jet fighters are stationed on five Korean airfields, with at least another 100 in Japan and with B-52 bombers in Okinawa [Ref. 32: p. 210].

The leadership function is performed by the Chief of Staff, Air Force. The typical senior officers are mostly Air Force Academy graduates, with at least Bachelor's degree in either Engineering or Science, and graduate level degrees (Masters mostly), either from civilian universities or the National Defense College.

By the mid-1970s the leadership has been increasingly depending upon the new generation officers, the product of the four-year Air Force Academy established in 1949. This career officer corps is a homogeneous, highly motivated, and

achievement-oriented group, the elite product of a careful selection system and an appropriate education. They represented in their rise to senior positions the development of professionalism and stability within the military. A strong sense of loyalty to the country and professional elitism engendered by the four-year academy education uniquely characterizes the academy graduates apart from the officers of other sources [Ref. 28].

They are playing a very important role under the situation that many of non-academy graduates are prone to leaving the services shortly after completion of their obligatory tour of duty. Main concerns of these academy officers are to improve readiness, achieve higher effectiveness, and to make the best usage of their human, financial and material resources. It is in this context that the question arises: Could the OD approach help the Korea Air Force increase its effectiveness?

C. EFFORTS FOR INCREASING ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE

In the early 1970s major upgrading of the Korea Air Force was being achieved under the five-year modernization program, including the addition of a fighter-bomber squadron, the acquisition of aircraft for anti-infiltration work, and replacement of fighter-bombers with new short-range models. An estimated 250 individual steel-and-concrete shelters

capable of withstanding anything but a direct hit from a 750-pound bomb had been completed as of 1972.

Even full achievement of the goals of the modernization plan for the Air Force did not envisage a force capable of taking over from United States forces the mission of air deterrence [Ref. 28: pp. 355-356].

While the nation was fostering its defense industry to a stage at which mass-production of all arms and munitions (excepting nuclear weapons and fighter aircraft) became a reality, the Korea Air Force itself exerted all its efforts to increase its effectiveness.

Pilsung-Undong (Sure Victory Movement), for example, is aimed at enhancing the morale, thus contributing to increased combat effectiveness. Pilsung-Undong was first begun in the Korea Air Force as an Air Force version of the nation-wide Saemaul-Undong (New Community Movement), which later inspired the other branches of the service to establish their own programs. Pilsung-Undong takes 40-50 students at a time from all over the Air Force units to remind Air Force personnel of Korea's positive side of the history, to encourage the practice of industrious daily habits, and to recognize their historical situation and responsibilities. This, in turn, results in better awareness of their duty, better motivation in personnel, and ultimately a contribution to increasing the effectiveness of the Korea Air Force [Ref. 33].

Tactics Development Wing was established several years ago utilizing highly skilled pilots who participated in the U.S. Red Flag Training Program, one of the world's most intensive and realistic combat training. The wing set up a program resembling that of the U.S. Red Flag and let the pilots experience realistic combat situations.

Meanwhile, the Korea Air Force has been sending more officers than ever before to various Allied countries to learn and compare each country's program.

D. FACTORS HELPING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE

There are several positive factors that encourage the introduction of OD, namely:

- (1) Environmental climate
- (2) Budget constraint
- (3) The size of the Korea Air Force
- (4) Cultural factor

Each of these will be explained as follows:

(1) Environmental climate: The nation-wide Saemaul-Undong and inside-the-Air Force Pilsung-Undong both are aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the organization. Also President Chun has made it clear on several occasions that he will try to establish a just democratic welfare society through Social Purification and Civic Awareness Reformation Movement [Ref. 34].

(2) Budget constraint: The national budget for FY 83 has about \$ 700 million deficit for the first time in its history [Ref. 35]. This will force higher productivity, or at least maintaining the present rate, while inputs are held constant or perhaps lowered. This situation alone creates a fertile ground for the OD approach.

(3) The size of the Korea Air Force: As it is the smallest component of the Korea Armed Forces, it consumes less material and utilizes less manpower than other services. Also, it has less complicated chains of command and less complex communication channels.

(4) Cultural factors: It has already been mentioned in the previous section that the Korean father has absolute power over his family, and his members are willing to follow him no matter what difficulties they may expect. This relationship is easily transferred to the work place. Once the top management commitment is made, it is more likely to be supported than in any other country.

E. FACTORS IMPEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE KOREA AIR FORCE

There are some negative factors that go against the introduction of OD, namely:

- (1) No support from the top
- (2) Cultural restraints

(3) Organizational structure

(4) Budget limit

Each of these is explained as follows:

(1) No support from the top: It seems that OD is not introduced in Korea, at least in Armed Forces. As no program has been proposed there has been no reaction from the top either. At the present time, it is hard to tell what the reaction will be.

(2) Cultural restraints: As mentioned in the previous section, due to the Confucian influence Koreans put a lot of emphasis on keeping proper relationships with each other. This, in turn, resulted in the efforts of saving the face of others, maintaining harmony among groups, being modest to others, not insisting on one's opinion and being willing to withdraw it whenever it becomes necessary to maintain the mood of cooperation. It also resulted in trying to be aware of what others do and/or want to do, trying not to go against one's seniors, and obeying orders.

All these efforts may not be favorable for OD activities that encourage such values as power sharing, decentralization of decision making, and openness and trust.

(3) Organizational structure: Even though the Korea Air Force is the smallest component of the Armed Forces, it still must coordinate activities and efforts, and assure interaction and communication between numerous complex and

diverse elements in order to accomplish its mission. To achieve this, the Air Force possesses an organization structured as a hierarchical bureaucracy. The chain of command is fully delineated and its employment is emphasized in a very typical pyramidal structure.

(4) Budget and resources limit: The Minister of Defense revealed to congressmen a plan to reorganize the military organization that will result in the savings of \$120 million in five years [Ref. 36]. With this plan, the introduction of a wide spread OD effort could be severely limited by resource constraints.

An attempt to allocate the funds for OD will require the commitment of several key senior leaders willing to engage in a congressional fight and to counter-argue whatever objections the other services might bring up regarding the use of these resources. This approach will be successful only if enough high ranking officials could be sincerely convinced and willing to commit themselves to a long-term effort. At this time, this is not likely to occur.

VI. CONCLUSION

The authors conclude that there are potentials for introducing OD in the Korea Air Force. Even though there is no awareness of OD, there is a nation-wide felt need and enthusiasm to improve effectiveness and efficiency and to change attitudes of its personnel. This is evidenced by the frequent appearance in the paper of such words as the Social Purification Movement, upgrading of administrative environment, civic awareness reformation, and establishment of social order.

The Korea Air Force itself is inferior in number to that of the North, and has far fewer fighters than the North. Its leaders are a group of homogeneous professionals concerned more about Air Force than themselves. They have been trying to update and improve the effectiveness of the Korea Air Force by employing such activities as Pilsung-Undong (Sure Victory Movement), realistic combat training, and sending more officers abroad to study.

Cultural restraints such as the Koreans' efforts to save the face of others, maintain harmony among groups, be modest to others, not insist on one's opinion and be willing to withdraw it whenever it becomes necessary, try to be aware of what others do and/or want to do, try not to go against

seniors, and obey orders can be overcome only if top managers can be persuaded of OD's successes and commit themselves to applying it.

Considering the widespread usage of OD in the U.S. military in spite of the general perception that military is the epitome of an authoritarian, mechanistic, and bureaucratic organization, the organizational structure of the Korea Air Force can not be a critically impeding factor, if it is a factor at all.

But, any attempt to immediately engage in OD in the Korea Air Force, as it is typically practiced in the United States will be doomed to failure. It goes without saying that a careful modification process should take place. Even if the modification process is followed, there is still a big effort required to achieve a cultural preparedness of the organization. OD efforts, as generally practiced in the Western culture encourage open discussions of conflict, and actively strive towards collaborative management. This might not comply with the Korean style of life.

The authors also believe that even though "textbook OD" could not be applied directly to the Korea Air Force, it can be beneficial for those who really want to improve their personal leadership and management capabilities. That's because if one is aware of the nature and limit of subordinates' consensus or obedience, and he is eager to

improve his true leadership, he might be able to get a lot of assistance from using certain techniques of OD.

This implied benefit indicates a need for the organization to train and prepare individuals in Organization Development, as well as for including formal courses of Behavioral Science, Leadership, and Organization Theory in the Curricula at the Air Force Academy, and to expand those at the Air Force College. Assigning some of the officers who come to the U.S. to study for a master's degree to specialize in OD might also be good. If this proposed scheme is followed, the organization will have developed in a period of four or five years so that enough human resources are knowledgeable in conducting OD efforts. If any attempt is to be made, however, it must be made on a gradual basis.

The authors advocate the gradual involvement in OD for the following reasons:

(1) It allows the time for people to learn how to do it. The Korea Air Force can get more human resources qualified in OD by sending people to school and letting them study OD and other related fields. This will build up necessary professional skills.

(2) Development of techniques and approaches applicable to Korea takes time. As mentioned already, the textbook OD of Western cultures can not be applied directly to Korea. Instead, a more gradual approach would cause less

pressure on people to develop OD before it was really thought through. A slower process of developing techniques and testing them would be appropriate.

(3) Cultural change is already under way within Korea. This change is more toward the Western than the traditional Korean culture. Emphasis on strict protocol, for example, is shifting toward more stress on effectiveness. The new generation of officers who think more about professionalism tend to value getting the job done effectively rather than clinging to the traditional values of the culture. In five years those people who are majors and colonels will make colonel and general. They will be more willing to listen to the proposals to improve the organizational effectiveness.

(4) It allows the time to integrate OD with Korean behavioral science and culture. As Western OD is based on Western psychology, sociology, and research, Korean OD should be based on Korean needs, values, expectations and its own study. Then Korea will be able to invent its own approaches and techniques suitable to itself. This may benefit the West as well.

A gradual approach will, authors believe, make OD more compatible with Korean culture and help improve the effectiveness of the Korea Air Force.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. The Academy of Management, OD Newsletter, Winter 1978.
2. French, W. L. and Bell, C. H., Organization Development: Behavioral Science Intervention for Organization Improvement, Prentice-Hall, 1978.
3. Beckhard, R., Organization Development: Strategies and Models, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969.
4. Richard Beckhard, "Some Assumptions about Change in Organizations", Unpublished mimeograph, data unknown.
5. Kolb, D. A. and Frohman, A. L., "An Organizational Development Approach to Consulting", Sloan Management Review, Fall 1970.
6. Umstot, D. D., "Organization Development Technology and the Military: A Surprising Merger?", Academy of Management Review, 1980, Vol. 5, No. 2.
7. U. S. Army War College, Studies on Leadership and Professionalism 1970-1971, undated.
8. Lt. Col. Malone, D. M., "The Prize", Army Magazine, March 1973.
9. Nadal, R. A., Duey, W. E., Ray, R., and Schaum, F. W., "Organizational Effectiveness in the U. S. Army" (Defense Documentation Center Report No. AD A0-43500) Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, DACSDMOE, April 1977.
10. U. S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, "Organizational Effectiveness Cost Benefit Analysis Report-1980", Fort Ord, California, October 1980.
11. Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, OESO Handbook: The Organizational Effectiveness View of the Total Organization, Fort Ord, California, undated.
12. Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Army Regulation No. 5-15 ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (OE)", 1 February, 1982.

13. "An Interview with CSA", Reprint Ed., W. C. Fields, ed., The OE Communique, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1980.
14. Cahn, M. M., "Organization Development in the United States Army: An Interview with Lt. Col. Ramon A. Nadal", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1978.
15. Forbes, R. L., "Organizational Development: An Analysis of the Navy Experience", paper presented as part of the NPS Working Series, Monterey, California, August 1977.
16. Bowers, D. G. and Franklin, J. L., Survey-guided Development: Data-based Organizational Change, Institute for Social Research, 1975.
17. Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 5300.6B Navy Human Resource Management Support System, 10 October 1975.
18. Forbes, R. L., "The Navy and Organizational Effectiveness", OE Communique, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1977.
19. Ferrier, S. W., "Army Organizational Effectiveness and Navy Organization Development: A Comparison and Contrast", The OE Communique, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1981.
20. Crawford, K. S. and Thomas, E. D., "Rates of first-term enlistment", Unpublished paper, San Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1978.
21. Ellermeier, J. D. and Curtis, E. W., "Readiness status of Navy ships before and after human resource management cycle", Unpublished paper, San Diego: U.S. Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1978.
22. MAJ. Champion, J. T., "Leadership and Management Consultation in the United States Air Force", OE Communique, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1977.
23. Ferrier, S. W., "The U.S. Air Force Management Consulting Program: Implications for Army OE", The OE Communique, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1981.
24. The Korea Daily News, October 9, 1982.
25. Korea Overseas Information Service, Ministry of Culture and Information, A Handbook of Korea, Seoul, Korea, 1979.
26. The Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1979, Seoul, Korea, 1980.

27. The Korea Daily News, September 10, 1982.
28. Vreeland, N., Just, P., Martindale, K., Moeller, P., and Shin, R., Area Handbook for South Korea, American University, Washington, D. C., 1975.
29. Kalton, M., Korean Ideas and Values, Philip Jaisohn Memorial Paper Number 7, 1979.
30. Crane, P. S., Korean Patterns, Kwangjin Publishing Co., Seoul, Korea, 1978.
31. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1981-1982, London, 1981.
32. Depuy, T. N., Hayes, G. P., and Andrew, J. C., The Almanac of World Military Power, Presidio Press of San Rafael, California, 1980.
33. Personal interview with LTC Chang, Duck-Soo, University of Pittsburgh.
34. The Korea Daily News, October 6, 1982.
35. The Korea Daily News, October 9, 1982.
36. The Korea Daily News, October 8, 1982.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 54 Department of Administrative Science Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
4. Office of the Air Attache Embassy of the Republic of Korea 2320 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20008	1
5. Library, Air Force Academy Republic of Korea Air Force Seoul, Korea	1
6. Professor Reuben T. Harris, Code 54He Department of Administrative Science Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
7. Professor John W. Creighton, Code 54Cf Department of Administrative Science Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	3
8. Professor Carson K. Eoyang, Code 54Eg Department of Administrative Science Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
9. Professor Richard A. McGonigal, Code 54Mb Department of Administrative Science Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1

10. Commander William R. Bishop, Code 54Bd 1
 Department of Administrative Science
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 93940

11. Lieutenant Colonel Lee, Young Tae, ROKAF 5
 3-3-5 Choong-Chung RO, So-Daemoon Gu,
 Seoul, Korea 120

12. Major Keum, Kiyoun, ROKAF 5
 Rm #217, New Sung Chang Building
 60-3, 2-ka, Chungmu-Ro, Chung-Gu
 Seoul, Korea

13. Lieutenant Colonel Chang, Duck-Soo 1
 210 Amber Street
 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15206

14. Assistant for Analysis, Evaluation (NMPC-6C) 1
 Human Resource Management & Personal Affairs
 Department
 Navy Military Personnel Command
 Washington, D.C. 20370

15. Director, Human Resource Management Division 1
 (NMPC-62)
 Human Resource Management & Personal Affairs
 Department
 Navy Military Personnel Command
 Washington, D.C. 20370

16. Director for HRM Plans and Policy (OP-150) 1
 Human Resource Management Division
 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,
 Personnel & Training)
 Washington, D.C. 20370

17. Commanding Officer 1
 Human Resource Management School
 Naval Air Station Memphis
 Millington, Tennessee 38054

18. Commanding Officer 1
 Organizational Effectiveness Center & School
 Fort Ord, California 93941

END

FILMED

5-83

DTIC